OFTEN Testing OpenFlow Networks by Kuzniar, Maciej et al.




TU Berlin / T-Labs
Dejan Kostic´
EPFL
Abstract—Software-defined networking and OpenFlow in
particular enable independent development of network devices
and software that controls them. Such separation of concerns
eases the introduction of new network functionality; however, it
leads to distributed responsibility for bugs. Despite the common
interface, separate development entails the need to test an
integrated network before deployment. In this work-in-progress
paper, we identify the challenges of creating an environment
that simplifies and systematically conducts such tests. We dis-
cuss optimizations required for efficient and reliable OpenFlow
switch black-box testing and present a possible approach to
address other challenges. In our preliminary prototype, we
combine systematic state-space exploration techniques with
real switches execution to explore an integrated network
behavior. Our initial results show that such methods help detect
previously unrevealed inconsistencies in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) empowers third-party
developers to create control software that tailors the network
behavior to specific applications—a vision currently enabled
by OpenFlow [1], which is de-facto the standard interface
for programmatically managing switches. Like others, we
believe SDN provides the opportunity for defining a more
principled approach to networking than the current state-of-
the-art. However, it is clear that the introduction of greater
programmability, despite its many advantages, raises the risk
of software faults (or simply bugs). This has undesirable
implications for the success of SDN, since developers are
relatively inexperienced, especially in this early stage.
The SDN architecture, still undergoing redefinition and
refinement through the literature [2]–[4], effectively decou-
ples the computation of network state from its distribution.
As such, there are several opportunities for bugs to creep
in. That is, faults may take place in any of the components
across the SDN stack. To start with, the high-level controller
application logic may be buggy. Programming errors may
also affect the SDN platform, that is, a software layer
that isolates the application from low-level details such as
topology discovery, state distribution, fault tolerance, etc.
The software agents running and implementing OpenFlow
on the switches may contain software defects. Additionally,
since SDN enables independent development of network
equipment and its control software, vendors may misinter-
pret the OpenFlow specifications or create implementations
that are not fully compatible and interoperable.
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In an attempt to ensure that network reliability is not
impaired by bugs, researchers have recently started working
on a rapidly-growing set of tools and techniques for de-
bugging and troubleshooting software-defined networks. For
example, our NICE [5] tool finds bugs in controller appli-
cations through systematic testing of application behaviors.
OFTest [6] is the reference suite of functional tests to check
an OpenFlow agent for adherence to protocol specifications.
OFLOPS [7] is a switch performance testing framework.
Finally, HSA [8] and VeriFlow [9] verify that the forwarding
tables satisfy desired network-wide invariants.
Note that these works focus on specific classes of prob-
lems and on a particular layer of the SDN stack. However,
an important aspect that has not received much attention is
that ultimately, it is necessary to test whether all components
of an SDN system work correctly when they are integrated
together. Our inability to formally verify complex systems or
the prohibitive costs associated with such an approach make
integration testing a common best practice. Therefore, for
SDN as for any complex system, testing is a crucial process
to gain confidence about correct intra- and inter-component
behavior.
Testing an integrated network is not alternative but rather
complementary to individual component testing. In partic-
ular, it addresses several shortcomings that are introduced
when testing components separately. For instance, testing
control software in isolation requires using an OpenFlow
switch model, which reduces fidelity [5]. Conversely, testing
a switch for OpenFlow compliance [6] validates the imple-
mentation at the level of individual protocol features but does
not shed light on the cross-feature interactions exercised by
a certain controller application.
Conceptually, testing an integrated network is a straight-
forward process. This form of testing involves setting up
a testbed with deployment-like conditions including wiring
the switches in a meaningful topology, configuring multiple
controllers based on performance and availability require-
ments, etc. Next, by following a testing specification, the
testbed is subjected to several exemplary scenarios while the
system behavior is compared to the desired outcome (which
is expressed in the testing specifications). Unfortunately,
writing testing specifications is a tedious, manual process.
Beside considering scenarios that account for common cases,
one also needs to reason about how to capture corner cases
that arise due to unforeseen delays and event reorderings
in the network. Moreover, the testing process requires a
precise and detailed specification of desired system behavior.
For complex scenarios, specifying correct behavior is often
nontrivial and error-prone.
In this work, we experiment with another approach that
leverages an observation that existing tools for testing
controller applications employ techniques to identify test
case scenarios. Moreover, using such tools already requires
high-level application correctness properties to be specified.
Therefore, we want to explore what is the effort required
to take an existing testing tool (we choose the home-grown
NICE [5]) and extend it to enable testing an SDN system
consisting of one or more controllers and a potentially het-
erogeneous collection of real switches. In doing so, we check
that the system operates without violating a preexisting list
of correctness properties.
NICE uncovers bugs in controller applications by system-
atically exploring the state space of an SDN system. Here,
system refers to the composition of an unmodified OpenFlow
controller with a model of the network environment. While
state-space exploration is essentially a brute-force approach,
NICE makes the process more efficient by augmenting
model checking (the core technique for systematic testing)
with symbolic execution (to automatically derive relevant
test inputs). The network model, which includes switches,
end hosts and a stub replacement of the NOX controller
platform, also contributes to the tool efficiency, though at
the expense of testing fidelity
Our goal is to enable systematic testing of an integrated
OpenFlow network with the ultimate objective of gaining
confidence in whether controllers and real switches work
correctly together in deployment-like settings. The high-
level idea is to systematically exercise behaviors of control
software (as thoroughly as possible), let the controller exe-
cution interact with real switches, and observe whether there
exist any erroneous conditions.
The main challenge we face is the inclusion of real
switches instead of using switch models in the testing
harness. In particular, we need to deal with several low-
level details such as communicating with the switches and
coalescing network state without affecting the representa-
tiveness of the underlying state. In addition, we want to
keep the number of assumptions we make about switch and
controller behaviors to a minimum.
We argue that a possible approach is to create OFTEN: an
OpenFlow Testing Environment. OFTEN is a tool for sys-
tematic testing of integrated OpenFlow networks. Building
upon NICE, it explores possible execution paths of controller
applications and network event orderings. It extends NICE
by enabling communication between the model checker and
real switches. To do so, we construct an environment model
for the switches that is capable of emulating controller,
end hosts and communication channels. We then add the
necessary glue to synchronize the state of the switch model
used in NICE with the state of this dual environment model
surrounding the real switch. The synchronization works by
fetching the flow tables from real switches and by controlling
the timing of network events such as processing packets or
OpenFlow messages. Finally, OFTEN reports both network-
wide correctness issues as well as inconsistencies between
switch models and real switches used for testing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the challenges that need to be tackled while
creating OFTEN. In Section III, we describe our approach to
testing OpenFlow network components. Section IV presents
preliminary results of our OFTEN prototype. We place our
work in the context of related work in Section V and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CHALLENGES
The design and development of any network-wide testing
tool entails a variety of challenges. In addition to usual
requirements such as providing high coverage and being
scalable, there are several domain specific problems that
need to be addressed.
Switch as a black-box: To provide a general solution,
the switches should be treated as black-boxes. We expect
the number of different OpenFlow switches to grow rapidly.
Therefore, the testing process should rely on a common,
standardized interface to minimize the overhead for testing
different network gears. Therefore, switches under test are
expected to expose the interface following the OpenFlow
specification [1]. The specification does not define how the
internal mechanisms are implemented, leaving choice to
vendors. Thus, only the externally visible behavior of the
switch should be checked.
However, the specification does not provide any interface
to fetch a device’s state. Specifically, there is no preexist-
ing way to reliably check whether a switch has finished
processing a test packet. In principle, such a mechanism
exists for message processing on the control channel: the
barrier request message from the controller forces the switch
to process all previous messages before replying with a
barrier response. In practice, for data-plane packets no such
information is available and there are sources [7] suggesting
that the barrier command is not implemented reliably.
Correctness definition: To verify that the system behaves
as desired, one needs to specify the expected behavior
for each test case. Validating network correctness requires
reasoning about correctness at two levels.
First, the network-wide correctness properties need to be
defined and checked to ensure there are no implementation
and/or logic bugs in the controller causing invalid net-
work behavior. Although there are some common properties
that can be predefined (e.g., loop-freedom), preparation of
application-specific ones might be a nontrivial and time-
consuming process. Moreover, it is difficult to define cor-
rectness properties that are never violated even during some
Figure 1: High-level overview of the tool. Combination of
systematic state-space exploration of the whole network
and execution of specific transitions on a real device.
transient conditions.
Second, to improve testing precision and aid in debugging,
low level switch correctness needs to be checked each time it
executes any action. Traditionally a developer specifies when
the test case succeeds and when it fails. However, because
the testing process is automated, the valid response of the
switch (accounting for the current state) to a given input
should be deduced without human interaction. Moreover,
OpenFlow switch behavior may in some cases be nonde-
terministic. Thus, the checking methodology must take this
into account and accept multiple correct outputs.
III. OPENFLOW TESTING ENVIRONMENT
We start by presenting a high-level overview of OFTEN,
our tool for systematic testing of integrated networks.
As mentioned, there are several layers and different parties
that may be responsible for incorrect network behavior in
an OpenFlow network. Thus, we aim to systematically test
interactions between network components before deploy-
ment. To do so, we use a model checker to explore possible
system execution paths and we create a testing harness that
enables us to extend the reach of the model checker to
real OpenFlow switches. Fig. 1 presents an overview of the
OFTEN architecture.
We use the home-grown NICE [5] tool as the engine
driving the testing process. At the core of NICE is a model
checker. NICE views an OpenFlow network as a transition
system. At each state, the system exposes a set of possible
transitions, each of which evolves the system from one state
to another. Model checking systematically explores system
behaviors by exercising possible system executions, that
is, sequences of transitions. To check system correctness,
NICE tests after each transition that predefined correctness
properties hold in the current state.
However, NICE is designed to test controller applications.
Therefore, all system components except for the controller
are replaced by simplified models. Thus, we must employ
additional techniques that enable us to replace the envi-
ronment model with real network devices. In the rest of
this section, we describe the techniques we adopt to create
OFTEN.
(a) topology
(b) test environment setup
Figure 2: Topology of a tested network (a) and a
corresponding test environment setup (b).
First, to make the controller–switch interaction possible,
we associate each switch model in the network environment
with a physical switch. Communication with the switch
happens at the level of network interfaces. The tested device
has to expose data-plane network interfaces to which an
OFTEN test harness running on a testing machine directly
connects. Additionally, the OFTEN test harness contains an
emulated controller that is capable of sending and capturing
OpenFlow messages in a controlled fashion. We connect
all tested switches to this controller. OFTEN supervises the
emulated controller, listens on the aforementioned interfaces,
and injects packets directly to them. Fig. 2 shows a topology
of a tested network (a) and a corresponding testing setup
with OFTEN (b). The test harness emulates end hosts and
is directly connected to both switches.
To increase usability, we minimize the requirements that
the switch must satisfy. The only assumption we make about
the switches is that they are compatible to some extent
with the OpenFlow protocol. This assumption is reason-
able considering that OpenFlow is the functionality we are
testing. The required specification subset is not defined and
depends on what features are used by the controller under
test. However, OFTEN relies on basic, mandatory protocol
features to coordinate the testing process.
Moreover, a model checker needs to be aware of the
state and possible transitions for each component of the
system it is testing. It also needs to execute transitions on
the components in a controlled and organized fashion. A
purposefully designed model provides an easy access to such
data and all features required by a model checker. However,
a real device exposing a narrow interface does not guarantee
such level of external control as the OpenFlow protocol is
not designed with testability in mind.
We choose to check correctness on two levels when testing
with real devices. We decide to rely mostly on user-defined
network-wide correctness properties, but complement them
with a fine-grained comparison of switch outputs. We argue,
that the network administrator is not interested in switch-
level differences unless they significantly affect the network.
Moreover, the OpenFlow specification is at times ambiguous
and allows certain nondeterministic switch behaviors. A low
level comparison of outputs for a model and the real switch
would unnecessarily report such cases and introduce false
positives. Although two switches that temporarily behave
differently lead to an inconsistent network state, the final
result may be correct for both. In our approach, the user
receives a high level report with property violations, and
is warned about differences in switch outputs for the same
input.
Unfortunately, some correctness properties specified in
NICE are too fine grained to be useful in our approach.
They require access to internal components of the switch in
order to, for example, verify if there are no packets that
are permanently left in any buffer. Such properties need
to be redesigned taking into account the assumed interface
of the switch. However, other, higher level properties (e.g.,
detection of lost packets in the network) stay unchanged and
may be reused in OFTEN.
A. Propagating switch state to a model
We now describe how we gather all required state from
switches. A model checker explores a space of system
states based on a system model composed of the controller
applications and models of switches and end hosts. Each
model describes the state and available transitions of its
corresponding component. In particular, a switch is defined
by: (i) content of its flow table, (ii) communication channels
and (iii) available transitions. The switch state kept in the
model has to be consistent with the state of the real device.
Thus, OFTEN synchronizes both states after finishing each
transition affecting the switch.
The first important element of switch state is the flow
table. A switch may be queried for the content of its
flow table using the OpenFlow interface. Thus, getting such
information requires just interpreting the switch response.
Switches use two types of communication channels: one
per port for packets and one for OpenFlow messages. There
is no standard interface used by switches to expose informa-
tion about the content of the buffers used to temporarily store
packets in the switches while processing them. However,
although these buffers are parts of an OpenFlow switch, in
our solution they are included only in the model. OFTEN
sends a packet to the switch immediately before the switch
runs the transition processing the packet. Therefore, the
buffers in the switch are empty after each transition finishes
and we do not have to query the switch for such information.
There are two types of transitions available for a switch:
(i) related to data packets and OpenFlow messages handling,
and (ii) time-related flow table modifications. We consider
only transitions that have externally visible effects. The
transitions that belong to the first group are available only
if there are packets in the corresponding communication
channels. As the communication channels are modeled ex-
ternally to the switch, the availability of the aforementioned
transitions is implied from the model.
The transitions in the second group represent timer-
initiated removal of rules from the flow table. To check in-
terleaving of different time-related events, the model checker
explicitly forces the timer event as one of the available
transitions. Therefore, the availability of such transitions is
not defined by the switch timers, but by the model itself.
B. Executing atomic transitions
A model checker performs a step of state space explo-
ration by executing one of the transitions enabled in current
state. Therefore, we need to define a set of transitions
and provide mechanisms to execute them. While applying
a transition to a model controlled by the model checker
is straightforward, it is more complex in the context of
OpenFlow switches. An OpenFlow switch is a nonterminat-
ing program that runs continuously, handling internal (e.g.,
timers) and external (e.g., packet arrival) events.
OpenFlow switches run close-sourced, proprietary soft-
ware that is also difficult to modify in case of hardware
switches. Therefore, we assume no access to the source
code and treat switches as black-boxes that satisfy only one
compulsory requirement: providing the OpenFlow interface.
There are two phases (shown in Fig. 3) of the externally
controlled execution of transition in the switch: (i) forcing
a transition to start and (ii) determining when it ends.
Starting packet processing. We need to induce a transition
execution at the right time. In a standard switch mode,
packet handling starts soon after the switch receives a new
packet. Therefore, transitions used in OFTEN are fired by
sending a packet (a data-plane packet or an OpenFlow
message) to the switch. Additionally, the order of handling
packets that arrive in a short time period and are placed in
different queues is nondeterministic. To make this process
deterministic, OFTEN keeps external packet queues in the
network model. When the model checker executes a packet
handling transition, the testing harness sends the first packet
in the queue to the switch. As a result, OFTEN can control
when the transition starts in a real switch. It is safe to
assume that soon after an input is available it is processed
by the switch. That is, we do not expect a situation where
the switch receives a packet and does not process it for
a long time. As we still have no precise guarantees how
much time the processing takes, we have to additionally
determine when it ends. We present our solution in the next
subsection. Additionally, using external queues allows us to
apply transitions simulating network events. Such transitions
include packets reordering, dropping, duplicating and other
events happening in the network.
Determining the end of event processing. As mentioned,
the ability to reliably determine when the black-box device
finished all internal processing related to the provided input
Figure 3: Execution of a handling transition on a real
switch. Sequence of communication and data propaga-
tion events between a switch model and a real switch
supervised by OFTEN.
is a nontrivial problem. The OpenFlow interface does not
provide a way to get such information. The simplest solu-
tion would be to wait for a predefined time interval after
supplying the switch with an input. However, this approach
is not reliable and requires choosing an interval sufficiently
long to minimize the probability of missing any behavior,
which increases the overhead while still offering no certain
guarantees. To solve this problem, we propose a few tech-
niques that depend on an additional assumption about the
switch capabilities. Although according to the OpenFlow
specification [1] a switch is allowed to arbitrarily reorder
processing of control-plane messages, our observations of
existing software and hardware devices show this not to be
the case. Therefore, we assume that events are processed
according to their arrival order at the switch. We also assume
that all packets arriving to the same data-plane port are
processed sequentially. We believe these assumptions are
reasonable since we inject inputs in a controlled fashion and
at a relatively slow pace. Next, we describe the issues that
we tackle in more detail.
• Control-plane message processing: The most reliable solu-
tion is to follow each message with a barrier request. When
a switch receives a barrier message from the controller, it
has to finish processing all earlier messages before sending
back a barrier response. However, this feature is not widely
and reliably supported in hardware switches [7], [10]. As a
workaround, OFTEN injects an additional Packet Out com-
mand containing a well-known packet after each message
from the controller. When we detect this packet, we assume
all processing is finished. Another solution is to follow each
control message with a flow install–flow remove pair and
wait for the flow removed notification.
• Data-plane packet processing: As there is no equivalent to
the barrier request for data-plane packets, we have to provide
a different way to detect when the switch finishes processing
a packet. There is a wide range of possible actions applied
to a packet. It can be dropped, forwarded to one or multiple
ports, or sent to the controller inside a Packet In message.
Therefore, assuming no knowledge of the forwarding state,
it is not possible to know in advance how many packets
should appear as output. Thus, we implement a general
solution based on the assumption that all packets arriving
to the same data-plane port are processed in their arrival
order. We first install two high-priority rules that forward
special well-known packets to a particular port and to the
controller, respectively. Then, OFTEN follows each injected
testing packet with two well-known packets matching the
aforementioned rules. When both are processed (one appears
on the expected port and the other is sent as the Packet In
message to the controller), we assume the original packet
was also handled.
C. Specifying root-causes of problems
Finding a problem in the network without pinpointing the
misbehaving device and conditions of when it happens does
not help administrators and developers sufficiently. To aid in
the debugging process, we take advantage of the diversity
of multiple OpenFlow switch implementations based on the
same specification.
There are two possible correctness properties violation
scenarios when testing a network with OFTEN. First, the
same correctness properties are violated when running with
both model and the real device. Such a result suggests the
controller is the source of the problems and need to be
investigated first. In the second case, there are differences
in correctness properties violated when using a model and
a real device. Then, it is unclear which component should
be blamed. However, in such a situation, testers may run
OFTEN using OpenFlow switches from different vendors.
Then, they compare the detected problems and choose the
most common behavior as a correct one. This approach is
based on the assumption that the same error can be made
by many vendors with a very low probability [11]. Finally,
if the tested device violates correctness properties others
do not violate, this device is probably faulty or does not
support features the controller application expects. On the
other hand, if multiple real devices uncover failures the
model is not able to detect, there is likely a problem with
the controller. Additionally, the model should be fixed as it
does not simulate a real switch correctly. Another hint that a
model is wrong is when it reports problems that real devices
do not detect.
D. Discussion
Approach limitations. The approach we take entails a
few limitations. Some are due to using model checking,
while others are consequences of the level of interaction
with the switches we choose. First, model checking forces
sequential execution of transitions. Therefore, it does not
put tested devices in a high load situation, thus missing
problems that may arise under stress conditions or when
performance bottlenecks are hit. For the same reason, it
is not possible to observe issues related to many events
happening within a short time interval. In fact model check-
ing explores transitions one by one and checks correctness
properties after each transition. Thus, there is a time gap
between each pair of events in the switch. Additionally, such
lack of control over time means that we are not able to
exercise timers. When it is possible OFTEN emulates them
(for example installing persistent flows and then sending
explicit flow remove command instead of relying on timer
induced removal). Finally, as all packets and messages stay
in the network model, the switch buffers are never full.
Thus, OFTEN does not detect issues visible only when many
packets are waiting for processing.
Alternative testbed design. In our design each switch is
directly connected to the testing harness. This way the net-
work needs to be rewired before testing. However, there are
other solutions that improve system scalability for running
with an unmodified network but they introduce additional
time overhead in exchange. In such a design, switches
stay connected to each other on a data-plane level. The
control-plane communication channel is directly connected
to the OFTEN harness. End hosts are also emulated by the
harness. In this setup, each transition on a switch (S) consists
of additional preliminary and cleaning phases. During the
preliminary phase, OFTEN installs the highest priority send-
all-to-the-controller rule at all switches directly connected to
S. As a result, all packets leaving S are captured by OFTEN
testing harness as Packet In messages. To inject a data plane
packet, OFTEN sends a Packet Out message containing this
packet to the correct neighbor of S. After the transition ends,
all rules installed during the preliminary phase are removed.
Communication with the controller stays unchanged.
Desirable switch features. Most challenges that OFTEN
solves are related to the fact that OpenFlow is not designed
with testability in mind. Although, as we show, it is possible
to use features specified by OpenFlow to conduct testing,
the introduction of just a few additional mechanisms can
make the process much simpler. First, like a barrier request
forcing synchronization for control messages, there should
be a similar way to determine when all data-plane packet
buffers are empty and no packets are being processed.
Additionally, switches may expose a standardized interface
to get detailed information about the internal state (e.g., con-
tents of buffers with packets sent to the controller). Finally,
determining when packet processing ends and obtaining the
switch state require sending additional OpenFlow messages.
This could have side effects on the tested OpenFlow agent,
and therefore, should be avoided. As there already is a
management and configuration protocol for OpenFlow [12],
a similar debugging protocol may be introduced that would
define a standardized, but external to OpenFlow, method
for acquiring information useful in troubleshooting a switch.
Such a protocol, supported by switches and specifying all
required features would make testing easier and help to
increase the reliability of OpenFlow networks. We will
consider this direction as part of our future work.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Using a preliminary OFTEN prototype, we tested three
real OpenFlow applications that were previously tested with
NICE [5]: a MAC-learning switch, energy-aware traffic
engineering and a server load-balancer. In all cases we
used the OpenFlow reference switch implementation (most
current version as of Apr 2012), OpenVSwitch (version
1.0.0) and an HP ProCurve E5406zl switch with OpenFlow
support (firmware release K.15.05.5001). OFTEN identified
two new issues.
Issue #1. OFTEN reveals one issue in the load-balancer
application that was previously undetected by NICE. Ac-
cording to the new OpenFlow specifications [1], the max-
imum length field of the send-to-controller action always
means the number of bytes to send. On the other hand,
until version 0.8.9, the specification defines zero as a special
value with the semantic of sending the whole packet. The
switch model ignored this field, always sending the whole
packet. When used with real switches, the load-balancer
was losing packets (NoForgottenPackets property violation)
during its reconfiguration phase. Further investigation shows
that the load-balancer, during reconfiguration, installs send-
to-controller rules with maximum length field set to zero
and expects to receive the whole packet. Therefore it is
incompatible with OpenFlow specification versions later
than 0.8.9.
Issue #2. The in-port field of Packet In messages set by
the switch model was incorrect when following the send to
controller action. However, this bug did not affect property
violations for any of the controllers. It was reported as a
warning and led us to improve the switch model.
V. RELATED WORK
Testing OpenFlow switches OFTest [6] is a unified frame-
work used to test correctness of OpenFlow switches. To
provide high coverage, developers need to design a large
number of test cases each of which targets a specific feature.
Additionally, there are usually tests developed with each
specific OpenFlow switch version provided by its creators.
OFLOPS [7] is a performance testing tool for OpenFlow
switches. It detects problems appearing when the device
is heavily loaded, but is also capable of discovering some
inconsistencies between data-plane and control-plane unde-
tectable in other ways.
Debugging a network Mininet [13] helps in prototyping
the network design. It allows to create a virtual network con-
sisting of a controller and multiple switches on one machine.
However, it does not enable systematic testing nor does
it provide low level correctness properties. The simulation
testbed developed by Google [14] uses a similar approach.
It uses real binaries of both controller and OpenFlow agents
while hardware and network are virtualized. Although it can
run multiple scenarios covering the entire network, it does
not target such a fine-grained systematic scenario exploration
as OFTEN.
There are also tools that aid in debugging a deployed
OpenFlow network. Such an approach accepts that bugs
affect the running network, while OFTEN detects them
before deployment. OFRewind [15] records traces of events
in a running network. When the network operators realize
incorrect behavior, OFRewind helps to locate its root cause
by replaying filtered traces. NDB [16] is a similar debugging
tool working on a finer granularity level.
VeriFlow [9] also works in a deployed network, but it
detects violations of safety properties upon rule modification
messages issued by the controller, preventing the update
from affecting the network.
Violations of basic network-wide properties may be de-
tected using the static data-plane configuration analysis tech-
nique proposed in [8]. Depending on the size and complexity
of the network this may be either an online or offline tool.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Despite the detailed specification and assumed separation
of concerns in OpenFlow networks, the behavior of an
integrated network might still be unexpected. In this paper
we argued for the necessity of having a network-wide testing
tool for OpenFlow. We identified the challenges that have to
be addressed when creating such a tool, and proposed the
initial approach for tackling them. We developed a prototype
of the tool that approaches the problem from one point of
view, and concentrates on systematic testing that achieves
high state-space coverage. We plan to further develop and
improve the tool to utilize other techniques suitable in
different scenarios.
OpenFlow is an emerging technology, which gives its
designers an opportunity to consider testability as one of the
key requirements. Our discussion shows that some problems
may be easily solved by including appropriate features in the
switch specification.
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